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COMMENT

The Extraterritorial Application of the
National Environmental Policy Act:
Formulating a Reliable Test for
Applying NEPA to Federal Agency
Actions Abroad
I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is the cornerstone of modern American environmental law.' NEPA contains lofty
environmental mandates designed to "encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment" and to "promote

efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere ... .." To ensure that the government promotes these objectives, NEPA requires all federal agencies to compile an environmental
impact statement (EIS) outlining potential environmental impacts and
alternatives for all proposed major agency actions that might significantly
affect the environment.4

The EIS requirement is central to NEPA's

regulatory scheme.

1. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1988)).
2. M. Blumm, The National Environmental Policy Act at Twenty: A Preface,20 Envtl. L 447,
447-54 (1990).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1988).
4. Id. at § 4332(2)(C) (1988). NEPA section 102(2)(C) provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible...
all agencies of the Federal Government shall .

.

. include in every

recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental
effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii)
alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local
short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented.
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From the outset, controversy arose over whether NEPA's EIS
provisions applied to federal agency actions occurring outside the United
States. Finding congressional intent on the issue ambiguous-as
measured through statutory language, legislative history, and administrative interpretations--courts have either avoided directly answering the
question or have explicitly restricted their holdings to the specific facts
of the case at hand.' Because of the courts' reluctance to conclusively rule
on the limits of NEPA's reach, the question of NEPA's extraterritorial
application has gone largely unanswered.
A recent entry into this line of cases, Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Massey,' addressed the issue of whether NEPA's EIS
provisions applied to National Science Foundation (NSF) activities in
Antarctica. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) sought a preliminary
injunction to halt NSF's operation of a new waste incinerator at its
research facility, alleging that NSF's failure to prepare an EIS for the
project violated NEPA.' The district court dismissed EDF's action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction because it could not find in NEPA "a clear
expression of legislative intent through a plain statement of extraterritorial statutory effect." 8 Based on the recent Supreme Court decision in
Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil Co.,9
which applied a strict presumption against applying United States laws
extraterritorially, the district court held that NEPA did not apply to NSF's
operation of incinerators in Antarctica. 0 EDF appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia saw the Massey
case differently and reversed the district court's decision. Noting that "the
district court below bypassed the threshold question of whether the
application of NEPA to agency actions in Antarctica presents an
extraterritoriality problem at all," the appellate court found that NEPA
regulates purely domestic decisions of federal agency officials that occur
almost exclusively in the United States and involve the workings of the
federal government." The court concluded that "since NEPA is designed
to regulate conduct occurring within the territory of the United States,
and imposes no substantive requirements which could be interpreted to
govern conduct abroad, the presumption against extraterritoriality does
not apply to this case.""2 The court was careful to point out, however,
5. See infra part II.
6. 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

7. Id.at 1297.
8. Id.
9. 499 US. 244 (1991).
10. 772 F. Supp. at 1298.
11. 986 F.2d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
12. Id. at 533. The court therefore remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether NSF had actually failed to comply with NEPA. Id. at 529.
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that "we do not decide today how NEPA might apply to actions in a case
involving an actual foreign sovereign.... ," thereby limiting its holding
to the application of NEPA to federal activities in Antarctica. 3
This comment looks generally at the application of NEPA abroad.
Part II reviews case law and other interpretations of NEPA's extraterritoriality before Massey. Part III looks at the district court's decision in
Massey and its application of the Supreme Court's "presumption against
extraterritoriality" rule. Part IV examines the Massey court of appeals'
reversal of the district court and its formulation of a test to determine
NEPA's extraterritorial reach. Part V analyzes how the court of appeals'
decision might affect application of NEPA to federal actions occurring
entirely in foreign countries. The conclusion is that courts should apply
a presumption of extraterritoriality for NEPA, rebuttable only when
NEPA application clashes with laws of another sovereign or impinges on
some other foreign policy objective.
II. THE HISTORY OF NEPA'S EXTRATERRITORIALITY
A.

NEPA's legislative mandates

Congress enacted NEPA in'response to growing concerns over
degradation of the world environment. 4 NEPA's EIS requirement forces
all 5 federal agencies to take a hard look at the environmental impacts
of their actions when they make a recommendation or report on
proposed agency actions." In preparing an EIS, a federal agency must
consider the environmental impacts of the proposed project, alternatives
to the project, and any adverse environmental effects of the action that
are unavoidable. 7 The final requirement may impose a substantive
duty on federal agencies to take steps to avoid adverse environmental
effects of their actions.' 8 NEPA, however, "while establishing 'significant substantive goals for the Nation,' imposes upon agencies duties that
are 'essentially procedural."' 19 Furthermore, NEPA does not require any
particular outcome of an agency's review, only that the agency weigh

13. Id. at 537.

14. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
15. NEPA requirements apply to all federal agencies, regardless of whether an agency's
other legislative mandates require consideration of environmental concerns. Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
16. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1979).
17. 14 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
18. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., 449 F.2d at 1115.

19. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per
curiam) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,558 (1978)).
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environmental costs against the benefits of the proposed action.2 ° The
Supreme Court has noted that "it is now well settled that NEPA itself
does not mandate particular results [and] simply prescribes the necessary
process," although "these procedures are almost certain to affect the
agency's substantive decision. " 21
NEPA is largely silent on whether its provisions apply to federal
agency actions abroad. Congress' omissions on this point have caused the
courts frustration in interpreting NEPA's application to projects that
occur outside the United States.' Courts have wrestled with NEPA's
language, minimal legislative history, and administrative interpretations
in an effort to determine the extent of NEPA's extraterritorial application,
but such attempts have met with little success or consistency in result.'
B. Administrative interpretationsof NEPA's extraterritoriality
NEPA created the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in
the executive branch of the federal government. One of CEQ's duties
is to interpret and oversee the legislative mandates of NEPA, z and
CEQ's interpretation of NEPA is generally granted "substantial deference."6 In 1976, CEQ concluded that the EIS requirement "applies to all
significant effects of proposed Federal actions on the quality of the
human environment-in the United States, in other countries, and in
areas outside the jurisdiction of any country .... ,27 Rules proposed by
CEQ would have required an agency considering actions affecting global
commons to comply fully with NEPA, and agencies considering actions
in foreign countries would have had to prepare an "environmental
statement." 28 Pressure from the State Department, however, forced CEQ

20. See Calvert Cliffs' CoordinatingComm., 449 F.2d at 1123.
21. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
22. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d
1345, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1981). "Construing the equivocal reach of NEPA abroad, however, is
a judicial endeavor oft-encountered, but not yet fully realized by any court." Id.
23. Id. at 1367. "NEPA's legislative history illuminates nothing in regard to extraterritorial
application." Id.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1988).
25. Id, § 4344.
26. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979); Marsh v. Oregon Natural
Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 372 (1989); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332, 354-56 (1989).
27. Council on Environmental Quality, Memorandum on the Application of the EIS
Requirement of Environmental Impacts Abroad of Major Federal Actions (1976), reprinted in 42
Fed. Reg. 61,066, 61,068 (1977).
28. Council on Environmental Quality, Draft Regulations on Applying NEPA to Significant
Foreign Environmental Effects (1978), reprinted in 8 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1495 (1978).
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to retreat from this position and withdraw the proposed rules."
Current CEQ regulations do not address NEPA's application to agency
actions occurring outside the United States." Thus, although CEQ's
earlier position that NEPA applies abroad has been influential in helping
courts decide NEPA's extraterritorial applicability,3' the agency's current
silence on the issue merely adds to the confusion.
In 1979, President Carter further confounded the question of
NEPA's application abroad when he issued Executive Order 12,114.2
The order purportedly "represents the United States government's
exclusive and complete determination of the procedural and other actions
to be taken by agencies to further the purpose of [NEPA] with respect to
the environment outside the United States.. . " In contrast to NEPA,
however, Executive Order 12,114 is significantly less demanding on
federal agencies because it severely limits the scope of actions that
require a full EIS.' For instance, in most cases the executive order
allows federal agencies to prepare an "environmental assessment" of their
actions, a document much less comprehensive than NEPA's EIS.' Also,
unlike NEPA, the order defines "environment" to exclude "social,
economic and other environments."' Furthermore, the order states that
an action significantly affects the environment if it "does significant
harm,"3" whereas the corresponding NEPA definition applies to actions
"affecting the quality"' of the environment. In addition to these limitations, Executive Order 12,114 provides no private cause of action.3
Thus, although the Executive Order appears to recognize the importance
of applying NEPA extraterritorially, exceptions and limitations render its
mandates relatively ineffective compared to NEPA requirements.
C. Judicial interpretationsof NEPA's extraterritoriality
NEPA case law has not clearly answered the question of whether
NEPA applies to federal agency actions occurring outside the territory of

29. Note, The Extraterritorial Application of NEPA under Executive Order 12,114, 13 Vand.
J.Transnat'l L. 173, 201-02 (1980).
30. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-17 (1992).
31. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 536.
32. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
33. Id.
34. See generally G. Pincus, Note, The "NEPA-Abroad" Controversy. Unresolved by an
Executive Order, 30 Buff. L. Rev. 611, 638-51 (1981).
35. Exec. Order No. 12,114 §§ 2-3 through 2-5, 3 C.F.R. §§ 357-59 (1980).
36. Id. § 3-4, 3 C.F.R. 360.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988) (emphasis added).
39. See Massey, 772 F. Supp. at 1298, rev'd on other grounds, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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the United States. Several courts have assumed that NEPA applies abroad,
but have declined to directly rule on the issue largely at the request of
the government, which in each case agreed to prepare an EIS for its
foreign action. In decisions rejecting NEPA's application to foreign
projects, the courts explicitly restricted their holdings to the specific
circumstances of the cases, thereby leaving open the possibility that
NEPA might apply to such actions absent overriding foreign policy
considerations.
Two early NEPA cases addressed whether NEPA requirements
apply to federal agency actions in United States trust territories. In People
of Enewetak v. Laird, plaintiffs sought to enjoin a federal project to
test explosives on a Pacific island that the United States held in trust.
Holding that NEPA applied to federal activities on the island, the district
court declared that "[by] its own terms, NEPA is not restricted to United
States territory delimited by the fifty states . . . .
The court's determination was based on the observation that "[wihere one would have
expected 'United States' to have been used, the lawmakers substituted the
much broader term 'Nation."' 42 Also, NEPA's legislative history was
couched in broad language, lending support to the conclusion that
Congress intended NEPA to apply abroad.43
In People of Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior," the court
reaffirmed that NEPA applies to United States trust territories. Relying
on the Supreme Court's opinion in Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo,45 the
Saipan court found that a statute would be presumed to apply only
within the territory of the United States only if all indicia of legislative
intent failed to answer the extraterritorial question.4 Because "both the
language and legislative history of NEPA evidenced a congressional
intent to apply the statute to all areas under United States control," the
court reaffirmed its decision in Enewetak that NEPA applied to trust
territories.47 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Saipan district court's
finding, but found that NEPA did not apply because the Saipan
government was not a federal agency within the meaning of NEPA.'
Other courts have addressed whether NEPA applies to federal
actions taking place in foreign countries, but none have squarely

40. 353 F. Supp. 811, 813 (D. Haw. 1973).
41. Id. at 816.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 816-19.
44. 356 F. Supp. 645 (D. Haw. 1973), modified on other grounds, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
45. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
46. Saipan, 356 F. Supp. at 649-50.
47. Id. at 650.
48. 502 F.2d 90, 96 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
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answered the question. In Sierra Club v. Adams, 9 the court assumed,
without deciding, that NEPA's EIS requirement applied to a highway
construction project in Panama and Columbia that could potentially allow
the epidemic spread of a serious livestock disease to cattle in the United
States.s' In noting that it was merely assuming NEPA applied to the
highway project because the government had prepared an EIS, the court
stated:
The effect of the construction.., also brings into question the
applicability of NEPA to United States foreign country projects
that produce entirely local environmental impacts, or as in this
case, some impacts that are strictly local and others that also
affect the United States ....

We leave consideration of this

important issue to another day."
In National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML)
v. Department of State,"2 the court partially answered the question of
NEPA's applicability to federal actions in foreign countries. In NORML,
plaintiffs claimed that the Department of State and other federal agencies
had violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS for their participation in
a program of spraying a chemical herbicide to help eradicate illegal
marijuana and poppy plants in Mexico.' Plaintiffs complained that the
spraying was causing serious health effects in persons who used the
plants in the United States. The court found that NEPA requirements
applied to a consideration of effects felt within the United States
environment.' When asked to answer the question of whether an EIS
would need to discuss environmental effects felt solely in Mexico, the
court only "assume[d], without deciding, that NEPA is fully applicable
to the Mexican herbicide program."' Because defendants agreed to
prepare an EIS that would include an analysis of such effects, the court
found that it did not need to reach the issue of whether NEPA required
consideration of environmental impacts in foreign countries.' The court
noted that the government "entreat[ed] the Court to assume, without
deciding, the applicability of NEPA to the Mexican impact of this
country's participation in chemical eradication efforts in Mexico."'
49. 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
50. Id. at 391-92 n.14.
51, Id.
52. 452 F. Supp. 1226 (DD.C. 1978).
53. Id. at 1228.
54. Id. at 1232.
55. Id. at 1233.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1232. The government has used similar tactics to avoid a conclusive ruling on
the NEPA extraterritoriality issue on other occasions. For instance, in Environmental Defense
Fund v. Agency for InternationalDevelopment, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,121 (D.D.C. 1975),.plaintiffs
challenged the government's failure to prepare an EIS for its role in helping foreign
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In two recent cases, the courts found that NEPA did not apply to
particular federal agency actions in foreign countries, based largely on
specific foreign policy considerations. In Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,1 plaintiffs challenged
a federal agency decision to license components for a nuclear reactor to
be built on a volcano and earthquake zone in the Philippines. Finding
foreign policy considerations controlling, the court held that NEPA
applied internationally only "where consistent with the foreign policy of
NEPA should not interfere with the right of a
the United States."
foreign country to determine its own environmental protection standards
or with the President's prerogative to determine foreign relations, at least
in the case of nuclear exports.' The court expressly limited its finding:
"[The court finds] only that NEPA does not apply to NRC nuclear export
licensing decisions-and not necessarily that the [EISI requirement is
inapplicable to some other major federal action abroad. "'61
In Greenpeace, USA v. Stone,' plaintiff alleged that the government
violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS covering the transportation
of missiles containing dangerous nerve gas through Germany and the
open oceans in order to dispose of the missiles on an island in the Pacific
Ocean. The court broke the activity into three segments:' 1) the movement of the missiles across German soil, 2) their transportation across the
open oceans, and 3) their disposal on Johnston Atoll, a United States trust
territory. Because the Department of Defense ("DOD") had prepared an
EIS for disposal of the missiles on the island, the court reviewed only the
first two segments of the journey.
In finding that NEPA did not apply to transportation of the missiles
through Germany, the Greenpeace court relied heavily on "the political
question and foreign policy considerations which would necessarily result
from such an application of a United States statute to joint actions taken
on foreign soil based on an agreement between the President and a
foreign head of state."' The court found that it could not justify the
political and foreign policy implications of imposing United States
environmental policy on an action occurring entirely in a foreign country

governments administer pesticide programs. The government settled the case by stipulating
that it would prepare an EIS for the action, thereby preventing the court from deciding
whether NEPA applied. Id. at 20,121-22.
58. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
59. Id. at 1366 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F)).
60. Id. at 1348.
61. Id. at 1366.
62. 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dismissed as moot. 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991).
63. The court thus implicitly conditioned its own finding that NEPA required a
"comprehensive environmental impact statement" covering the entire transport and disposal
action on a finding that NEPA applied extraterritorially. 748 F. Supp. at 757. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.25(a)(1) (1992) (requiring that "connected actions" be considered together in a single
EIS).
64. 748 F. Supp. at 757.
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that had approved of the transportation.' The court also noted that
employing NEPA in this case would interfere with an agreement between
President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl of Germany."6
The Greenpeace court also found that NEPA did not apply to the
transoceanic segment of the transportation. The DOD had prepared an
environmental analysis (EA) under Executive Order 12,114 for the
transoceanic portion of the transport. The EA concluded that the
transportation "would cause no significant impact on the environment of
the global commons, assuming that none of the low probability accidents
examined actually occur."67 Noting that Executive Order 12,114 does not
preempt application of NEPA to all federal agency actions occurring
outside the United States, the court nonetheless deferred to the DOD's
compliance with the order and found that NEPA did not apply to the
transoceanic segment of the transportation.' Foreign policy considerations were again persuasive, because forcing the DOD to comply with
NEPA even for the transoceanic segment would "affect the movement of
the weapons through West Germany. " 6
In reaching the conclusion that NEPA did not apply to the first two
segments of the transportation, the Greenpeace court relied on concepts
from the presumption against extraterritoriality doctrine.' The court
noted that "absent evidence of Congressional intent to the contrary, a
federal statute should be construed as applying only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States."' Although "the language of NEPA
indicates that Congress was concerned with the global environment and
the worldwide character of environmental problems," the court concluded that NEPA "does not explicitly provide that its requirements are to
apply extraterritorially." 7 A strict reading of the statute's language
called NEPA's extraterritorial application into doubt. Like the NRDC
court, however, the Greenpeace court limited its holdings on NEPA's
extraterritorial application to the particular circumstances of a case
involving overriding foreign policy implications. 3

65. Id. at 759-60,
66. Id. at 758.
67. Id. at 762 (quoting DOD's Global Commons Environmental Assessment). The
assessment thus reached a "Finding of No Significant Impact" ("FONSI"), negating the
preparation of an EIS pursuant to Executive Order 12,114. Id.
68. Id. at 762-63,
69. Id. at 763.
70. See generally id. at 758-63.
71. Id. at 758 (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,285 (1949); McKeel v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983); Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 11 (9th
Cir. 1964); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir.
1984)).
72. Id. at 759.
73. Id. at 768. "In other circumstances, NEPA may require a federal agency to prepare an
Id. at 761 (citations omitted).
EIS for action taken abroad ....
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III. DECISION OF THE MASSEY DISTRICT COURT
Shortly after the District of Hawaii's treatment of the Greenpeace case, the District Court for the District of Columbia was faced the
question of whether NEPA applied to federal agency actions in Antarctica. Like the open oceans addressed in Greenpeace, Antarctica is an
area of global commons over which no country is truly sovereign.'
Relying on a strict interpretation of the presumption against extraterritoriality doctrine recently reaffirmed in Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 5 the district
court in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey76 refused to
apply NEPA to federal actions occurring in global commons such as
Antarctica.
A.

Statement of the case

In Massey, plaintiff Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) sought a
preliminary injunction to prevent the National Science Foundation (NSF)
from incinerating food and other domestic waste at NSF's McMurdo
Station in Antarctica.' EDF contended that NSF's failure to prepare an
EIS for the incineration violated NEPA, CEQ regulations, and Executive
Order 12,114.' NSF filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, asserting that NEPA does not apply to federal agency actions
outside the United States and because Executive Order 12,114 does not
create a cause of action.' The district court upheld NSF's motion on
both grounds.
B.

The district court's analysis

Rejecting the extraterritorial application of NEPA, the district
court noted that the Supreme Court had recently reaffirmed the presumption against extraterritoriality doctrine. In Aramco, the Supreme Court
concluded that "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears,
is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.' 8 The Massey court determined from Aramco that for a statute
74. See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
75. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
76. 772 F. Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd, 986 F,2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
77, Id. at 1297.
78. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1969); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1990); 44 Fed, Reg.
1957 (1979)).
79. 772 F. Supp. at 1297.
80. Id. at 1297 (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336
U.S, 281, 285 (1949))).
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to apply extraterritorially "the affirmative intention of the Congress [must
be] clearly expressed."' After a brief recital of some of NEPA's provisions, the court summarily dismissed NEPA's broad language as failing
"to provide a clear expression of legislative intent through a plain
statement of extraterritorial statutory effect."' Finding an analysis of
statutory language sufficient, the court stated that it "does not need to
examine the legislative history in order to divine Congressional intent."'
The conclusion that NEPA's statutory language provided no clear
expression of an intent to apply NEPA extraterritorially left the court
with "no choice but to decide that NEPA does not apply to the NSF's
decision to build the incinerators in the Antarctica.""
C.

The presumption against extraterritoriality

In addition to missing the threshold question of whether the case
presented an issue of extraterritoriality,' the district court misapplied
the presumption against extraterritoriality doctrine. The presumption
begins with congressional authority and power to regulate activities
occurring outside United States territory. The United States Constitution
grants Congress such authority as the power to define offenses on the
high seas or against the law of nations.' The Supreme Court has upheld
this power in a number of situations and under a variety of laws." In
addition, "the United States is not debarred by any rule of international

81. 772 F. Supp. at 1297 (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248).
82. Id. The court's analysis consisted of the following:
The Court cannot ferret out a clear expression of Congress' intention that
NEPA should apply beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Rather, NEPA contends [sic] language such as "the human environment"
see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), "the worldwide and long-range character of
environmental proble'ns" see id. at § 4332(2)(F), and the purpose of NEPA
is to "encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment land] to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere." See id. at § 4321.
d.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1298 (footnote omitted).
85. See infra part IV for a discussion of the court of appeals' analysis of this threshold
question.
86. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
87. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-100 (1922) (holding that Congress may
regulate criminal activity outside the territory of the United States); Vermila-Brown Co. v.
Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 381 (1948) (holding that "Congress may regulate the actions of our
citizens outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States whether or not the act
punished occurred within the territory of a foreign nation"); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344
U.S. 280, 282-86 (1952) (finding that United States trademark law applies to activities in
Mexico).
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law from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas
or even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations and their
nationals are not infringed."" The Supreme Court noted in Aramco that
"[bloth parties concede, as they must, that Congress has the authority to
enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States."'
Thus, if it so desires, Congress may authorize the extraterritorial
application of a statute such as NEPA.
To determine whether a statute applies to conduct occurring
outside the United States, courts have generally attempted to discern
congressional intent through an analysis of statutory construction. The
analysis has traditionally started with the assumption that "legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' This premise represents the so-called "presumption against extraterritoriality" or "presumption of territoriality" doctrine. Unless Congress "clearly expressed" an
"affirmative intention" to apply the statute to extraterritorial activities, a
law of the United States will only be applied to conduct occurring within
United States territory. 91
The tendency of Congress to phrase statutes in "[wlords having
universal scope" confounds attempts to look for a clear expression of
congressional intent.' The broad wording of statutes suggests that
almost all United States law should enjoy extraterritorial application, and
a number of courts have struggled with the implications of this result."
The Supreme Court, however, has found that ambiguous statutory
language alone does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.%

88. Steele, 344 U.S. at 285-86 (quoting Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)). See also
Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 63 (1934) (stating that a nation "has jurisdiction over its
nationals wherever they may be to require or forbid them to do an act unless the exercise
of this jurisdiction involves the violation of the law or public policy of the state where the
national is").
89. 499 US. at 248.
90. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) quoted in Aramco, 499 US. at 248.
See also American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909); Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 38 (1965). "The rules of United
states statutory law... apply only to conduct occurring within, or having effect within, the
territory of the United States, unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the statute." Id.
91. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
92. American Banana, 213 US. at 357.
93. See G.Born, A Reappraisalof the ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Law, 24 Law & Pol'y Int'l
Bus. 1, 7 (1992) (citing several cases and other authorities that have found that various
statutes are "couched in the most general terms and suggest no meaningful geographic
limits").
94. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357.
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In an effort to overcome the problem of overly broad language,
courts applying the presumption against extraterritoriality doctrine often
look to other indicia of congressional intent to support their conclusions
on a statute's extraterritorial effect. For instance, in Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, the case from which Aramco derived its presumption against
extraterritoriality rule," the Supreme Court examined a labor law's
overall scheme, legislative history, and administrative interpretations to
help determine whether Congress intended it to apply abroad." In
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., the Supreme Court relied in large part on the
statute's underlying purpose, the nationality of the regulated parties, and
the absence of conflict between United States and Mexican law to find
that a trademark act could regulate a defendant's conduct in Mexico.'
Also, the Court has found extraterritorial application of United States
criminal law when Congress has not been explicit in including "specific
provisions in the law that the locus shall include the high seas of foreign
countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense."'
Thus, ambiguous language should not defeat a statute's extraterritorial
application when such limits would necessarily "curtail the scope and
usefulness of the statute" and leave a large loophole in the law's protections."
In contrast to Supreme Court cases that looked beyond a statute's
language to discern its applicability abroad, the Aramco Court did not
apply Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964° extraterritorially
because its language "is ambiguous, and does not speak directly to the
question presented here.""1 The Court failed to address the Act's
legislative history or other indicia of congressional intent that might
clarify its extraterritorial application, although it noted that a number of
"other elements" in Title VII's statutory framework suggested a "purely
domestic focus."" The3 dissent rejected the majority's invocation of a
"clear statement" rule,1' noting that the presumption against extraterritoriality was only a "weak presumption" that should not be applied until
a court has "exhausted all available indicia of Congress' intent."' 4

95. See 499 U.S. at 248.
96. 336 U.S. at 286-90.

97. 344 U.S. 280, 285-89 (1952).
98. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). 'The necessary locus [of a statute's
reach], when not specifically defined, depends on the purpose of Congress .....

98.
99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077.
499 U.S. at 250.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 261 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 265-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Id. at 97-
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The purpose of the presumption against extraterritoriality is "to
protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other
nations which could result in international discord. " r°" A long-standing
principle of statutory construction states that "an act of Congress ought
never be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains."" ° When conflicts of law become evident, a
regulating country should defer to the other country's law if that
country's interest is clearly greater.1°7 Following this premise, the
Supreme Court has created a rule that a United States law will not be
applied extraterritorially when such conflict exists,"a
Courts often recognize an exception to the presumption against
extraterritoriality doctrine when an action occurring in a foreign country
significantly affects the environment of United States. When conduct
abroad results in effects reaching the regulating nation, international law
allows a nation to "impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends.""'9 This exception has been
applied in a number of contexts in which a failure to apply a statute
extraterritorially would have had negative effects within the United
States." Exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction may not be "unreasonable," as determined by such factors as the extent to which the activity
takes place or has effects within the territory of the regulating state,
nationalities of the parties, the importance of the regulation within the
state, and the likelihood of conflict with another sovereign's
regulating
1
laws."
105. Id. at 248.
106. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
107. Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 403(3) (1986).
108. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571,582 (1953); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S.
280, 289 (1952).
109. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,443 (2d Cir. 1945). See also
Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 402(1)(c) (1987). A nation may regulate conduct
outside its territory "that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory" Id.
110. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (United States trademark act
applies extraterritorially when defendant is a United States citizen); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (United States antitrust laws apply
extraterritorially); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 925
(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Jurisdiction exists under United States antitrust laws whenever conduct
is intended to, and results in, substantial effects within the United States."); Schoenbaum v.
Firstbank, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) (United States securities laws apply extraterritorially
when necessary to protect American investors).
111. Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 403 (1987). Section 403(2) determines
what is "reasonable" as follows:
Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable
is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where
appropriate: (a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating
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The Massey district court's application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality was inadequate. Although the court recognized that
Congress "selected broad language to describe NEPA's purpose .... "'
it failed to find a "clear expression of Congress' intention that NEPA
112
should apply beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
The court's analysis ended there. Apparently the Massey district court
interpreted the Aramco "clear expression" rule as restricting the reviewing
court to literal translations of statutory language without any assistance
from other indicia of legislative intent. The court's interpretation,
however, does not comport with cases upon which the presumption
against extraterritoriality is based.
After determining that NEPA's language suggested a broad
application, the Massey district court should have moved onto other
sources of congressional intent to determine NEPA's application. First,
the court should have looked at NEPA as a whole, as the Supreme Court
did in Steele and Bowman, to determine NEPA's purpose and the effect
that restricting its application would have on this purpose. Second,
following the Supreme Court in Foley Bros., the district court should have
reviewed NEPA's legislative history and administrative interpretations.
This level of review is precisely the application of Foley Bros. that the
Saipan court completed in determining that NEPA applied to federal
actions in United States trust territories. Finally, the Massey district court
should have examined NEPA case law to determine what other courts
have found regarding NEPA's extraterritorial effect, rather than dismissing such case law as "not directly addressling] whether NEPA applies
extraterritorially." 113 The reasoning and conclusions of earlier courts

state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory,
or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; (b)
the connections, such as the nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between the state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be
regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent
to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the
desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; (d) the existence of
justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; (e)
the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system; (f)
the extent to which the regulation is consistent with
the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another
state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood
of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id.
112. 772 F. Supp. at 1297.
113. Id. (citation omitted).
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concerning NEPA's application provide important guidance in determining NEPA's extraterritorial application.
Even if the Massey district court had looked at all these other
indicia of congressional intent regarding NEPA's extraterritorial
application, it still may have concluded that NEPA did not apply to NSF
activities in Antarctica. Although all the evidence taken together suggests
that NEPA should be applied to federal activities occurring outside the
United States, the argument for the opposite result is also persuasive. If
the court had thoroughly analyzed all relevant evidence, however, its
decision would have been more persuasive and less open to attack than
the simple statement that "this Court has no choice but to decide that
apply to the NSF's decision to build the incinerators in
NEPA does not
4
Antarctica." 1
IV. DECISION OF THE MASSEY COURT OF APPEALS
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the decision of the Massey district court.'" The Massey appellate court admonished the district court for "bypass[ingi the threshold
question of whether the application of NEPA to agency actions in
Antarctica presents an extraterritorial question at all.""" The court held
that, because NEPA regulates conduct that "occurs primarily, if not
exclusively, in the United States," the presumption against extraterritoriality espoused in Aramco does not apply."' The court broke its analysis
into two parts: 1) assessing the importance of where the conduct regulated
by the statute actually occurred and 2) assessing the importance of where
the effects of that conduct are felt.
A. Analysis of the regulated conduct
The Massey court of appeals began its analysis of whether NEPA
applies extraterritorially by noting that "Ithere are at least three general
categories of cases for which the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of statutes clearly does not apply.""' First, the presumption
does not apply when "an affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed" extends the scope of the statute to cover conduct occurring

114. Id. at 1298 (footnote omitted).
115. Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
116. Id. at 532. "Inparticular, the court failed to determine whether the statute seeks to
regulate conduct in the United States or in another sovereign country." Id.
117. Id. at 529.
118. Id. at 531.
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outside the United States. 119 Second, the presumption is generally not
applied when failure to extend the statute to conduct abroad will result
in adverse effects within the United States.'" Third, the extraterritorial
presumption is not applicable when the regulated conduct occurs within
the United States, because by definition "an extraterritorial application of
a statute12 1involves the regulation of conduct beyond United States
borders."
The third exception actually represents a threshold question of
whether the case presents an extraterritorial problem in the first place. If
NEPA seeks to regulate conduct primarily in the United States and not
a foreign country, then the problem is one of domestic application, even
where significant effects of the action are felt outside the United
States.2 The Massey appellate court noted that the district court failed
to address this question.123 The district court's oversight turned out to
be fatal to its decision because, '[after a thorough review of these
relevant factors," the appellate court concluded that "this case does not
present an issue of extraterritoriality.""
The appellate court found that "NEPA is designed to control the
decision-making process of United States federal agencies, not the
substance of agency decisions."" z The court noted that the heart of
NEPA, its "action-forcing" EIS provision, requires "all agencies of the
Federal Government" to prepare an EIS for "major Federal actions" that
could significantly affect the "human environment." 26 The EIS provision binds only American officials and controls only governmental
decisionmaking, an activity that occurs almost exclusively in the United
States. 27 Because Congress enacted NEPA to effect the factors that
government officials consider in exercising agency discretion, NEPA
"created a process whereby American officials, while acting in the United

119. Id. (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353
U.S. 138, 147 (1957))). But see Aramco, 499 U.S. at 261 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (rejecting the

Aramco majority's application of a clear expression rule under the presumption against
extraterritoriality doctrine).
120. 986 F.2d at 531. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
121. 986 FP2d at 531.
122. Id. at 531-32 (citing Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 921 (2d Cir. 1984); Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 17, 38 (1965);
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 492(1)(a),(b) (1987)).

123. 986 F.2d at 532.
124. Id.
125.
126.
Valley
127.

Id.
Id.(citing S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969); Robertson v. Methow
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988)).
986 F.2d at 532.
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States, can reach enlightened policy decisions by taking into account
environmental effects." 8 Such decisions are "uniquely domestic.""z
In support of its finding that application of NEPA does not
invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality, the appellate court
noted that NEPA "does not dictate agency policy or determine the fate
of contemplated actions."' 3 NEPA does not mandate substantive
requirements, but merely requires federal officials to consider environmental effects and does not dictate that environmental concerns be given
greater weight than other policy concerns. 131 In addition, the court
distinguished Massey from Aramco and other cases applying the presumption against extraterritoriality because "NEPA would never require
enforcement in a foreign forum or involve 'choice of law' dilemmas" with
which those cases were concerned. 32 The fact that NEPA does not
impose substantive requirements and does not create conflict of law
problems is evidence that NEPA affects only domestic conduct.
The Massey court also looked to Antarctica's unique position as
a global commons to support its decision that the presumption against
extraterritoriality did not apply to the NSF activities. Aramco explicitly
stated that courts applying the presumption should look to see if
Congress intended to extend the statute's reach "beyond places over
which the United States has sovereignty or some measure of legislative
control."" Because Antarctica is a sovereignless region over which the
United States has exercised "a great measure of legislative control," the
court concluded that "the presumption of territoriality has little relevance
and a dubious basis for application" in this case." The question of
NEPA's application to federal agency actions in Antarctica thus did not
invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality.
The court summarily dismissed NSF's contention that, even if the
presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply, NEPA's plain
language precludes its application to decisions regarding federal actions
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. Id. (citing Mary A. McDougall, Extraterritorialityandthe EndangeredSpecies Act of.1973,
80 Geo. L.J. 435, 445 (1991)). The Massey court is not the first court to reach this result. In
NRDC, the court conceded that nuclear plant export licensing, the conduct regulated by
NEPA in that case, "takes place of course, at NRC headquarters inside the United States."
647 F.2d at 1355. See also id. at 1384 n.138 (Robinson, J., concurring in the judgment). This
suggests NRDC may not have presented a question of NEPA extraterritoriality because
"[the licensing procedure takes place entirely within the United States and domestic law
completely extends its force then and there." Id.
130. 986 F.2d at 532 (citing Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350; Strycker's Bay Neighborhood
Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam)).
131. Id. (citing Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350). See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
132. 986 F.2d at 533.
133. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285) (emphasis added).
134. 986 F.2d at 534.
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in Antarctica." s Citing NEPA case law," NEPA statutory language, 137 and CEQ's interpretation of NEPA,"8 the court found that
NEPA incorporates broad language that clearly applies to decisions
regarding actions having environmental effects partly or entirely outside
the United States.'
B.

Analysis of the effects of the regulated conduct

The Massey court of appeals next turned to the second tier of its
analysis: whether the effects of applying NEPA to federal activities in
Antarctica would interfere with national security and foreign policy. NSF
complained that a NEPA injunction would hamper its "ability to
cooperate with other nations in Antarctica in accordance with United
States foreign policy. "11° The Massey court agreed that such interference
with foreign policy considerations might render NEPA inapplicable to a
given case, but found that "NSF's efforts to cooperate with foreign
governments regarding environmental practices in Antarctica will not be
frustrated by forced compliance with NEPA." 4
The court cited NRDC for the premise that "where the EIS
requirement proves to be incompatible with [NEPA section) 102(2)(F),
federal agencies will not be subject to injunctions forcing compliance with
[NEPA section) 102(2)(C). " "2 In NRDC, the court found that the EIS

135. Id. at 535-36.
136. Id. at 536 (citing Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (ITlhe sweep of NEPA is extraordinarily
broad, compelling consideration of any and all types of environmental impact of federal
action."); City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("[NEPAI was
designed explicitly to take account of impending as well as present crises in this country
and in the world as a whole."); Enewetak, 353 F. Supp. at 816. ("[There appears to have been
a conscious effort to avoid the use of restrictive or limiting terminology.").
137. 986 F.2d at 536 (citing 42 US.C. § 4321 (1988) (NEPA is intended to "encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment" as well as "to
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere."); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (Federal agencies are required to "recognize the
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems.")).
138. 986 F.2d at 536 ("[Pjrior to the issuance of Executive Order 12,114, the [CEQ]
maintained that NEPA applies to the decisionaking process of federal agencies regarding
actions in Antarctica.") Because CEQ is the agency Congress created to oversee NEPA
implementation, its interpretation of NEPA is generally entitled to "substantial deference."
Id. (citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979)).
139. 986 F.2d at 536.
140. Id. at 535.
141. Id.
142. ld. (citing NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1366). Section 102(2)(F) requires all federal agencies to
.recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and, where
consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to
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requirement was subordinate to section 102(2)(F's explicit directive
requiring federal agencies to cooperate with other nations where
consistent with United States foreign policy." The Massey court also
relied on Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg'" to support
this premise, noting that the Seaborg court "refused to issue an injunction
under NEPA, despite the real potential for significant harm to the
environment, because the government made 'assertions of harm to
national security and foreign policy. ' "145 Therefore, where compliance
with the EIS requirement interferes with foreign policy considerations,
NEPA itself dictates that an EIS need not be completed. The Massey court
found, however, that NEPA compliance would not affect NSF's foreign
policy requirements in this manner.
The Massey court of appeals' decision provides a more thorough
and logical analysis of NEPA's application to federal agency actions in
Antarctica than the district court's decision. Massey sets clear precedent
for other courts to follow, or disagree with, because it clearly lays out the
factors that the court of appeals applied in its analysis. Most importantly,
the court of appeals' holding that NEPA almost inevitably regulates
decisionmaking conduct occurring largely in the United States sets the
groundwork for a general rule regarding NEPA's application to all
agency activities that occur outside the United States.
V. APPLYING NEPA IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Even after the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Massey, the question of
whether NEPA applies to federal actions occurring in foreign countries
had not been explicitly answered. The growing complexity of the modern
world and recognition that environmental effects regularly cross
international borders 4 6 suggest that national governments have an
obligation to act responsibly regarding effects of their actions, no matter
where such effects or actions occur. NEPA represents the United States
answer to this obligation, particularly when it is enforced under a
presumption of extraterritoriality rule that logically follows from the
Massey decision. Despite assertions that "we do not decide today how

initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F).
143. NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1348.
144. 463 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
145. 986 F.2d at 535 (quoting Seaborg, 463 F.2d at 798).
146. "In today's highly integrated world economy, international economic policy issues
are inseparably intertwined with domestic policy issues. International features arise
naturally as one considers traditionally domestic issues such as fiscal policy, monetary
policy, and environmental policy." The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors
264 (1990) (emphasis added).
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NEPA might apply to actions in a case involving an actual foreign
sovereign ... , "147 the test that the Massey court of appeals applied in
determining whether NEPA applies to Antarctica extrapolates well into
the arena of foreign sovereigns.
In reviewing whether NEPA should apply to an agency action
occurring in a foreign country, a court must first look to the conduct that
NEPA is regulating. The conduct will always be the decision-making
process of the federal agency which has proposed an action in a foreign
country, not the proposed action itself. Because almost all federal agency
decisions are made by governmental officials whose offices are in the
United States,148 the presumption against extraterritoriality articulated
in Aramco will rarely apply to NEPA cases unless the agency decisions
are made almost entirely in the foreign country. The actual locus of the
proposed agency action is irrelevant to the first stage of the analysis. If
the court determines that the basic decisions concerning the proposed
action are to be made in the United States, no question of extraterritoriality exists and NEPA applies."
Once a court determines that NEPA is regulating a domestic
decision, NEPA mandates that "the government may avoid the EIS
requirement where United States foreign policy interests outweigh the
benefits derived from preparing an EIS." s° The NEPA analysis is thus
given a degree of flexibility that alleviates the pressure that NEPA
requirements might place on important foreign policy interests. A court
may relieve the federal agency from its NEPA duties if the EIS requirement presents a clear and unavoidable conflict with the agency's
statutory authority, including conflicts arising out of timetables imposed
by statute,'s' or when the foreign policy interests at stake are particularly important or delicate, as in NRDC and Greenpeace.
Conflicts with foreign policy interests will be more common
when the agency action occurs in a foreign country than they are in

147. 986 F.2d at 537.
148. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 532-33; NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1384 n.138 (Robinson, J., concurring
in the judgment).
149. This result is consistent with the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law §
402(1)(a) (1986) (noting that a state may exercise jurisdiction over "conduct that, wholly or
in substantial part, takes place within its territory"). The Restatement also allows states to
exercise jurisdiction over "the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside
as well as within its territory." Id. § 402(2). Federal agencies are clearly such "nationals."
150. Massey, 986 F.2d at 535.
151. Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776,791 (1976). See also
Calvert Cliff ' CoordinatingComm., 449 F.2d at 1128 CNEPA requires that an agency must--to
the fullest extent possible under its other statutory obligations--consider alternatives to its actions
which would reduce environmental damage.") (emphasis added).
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Enewetak's trust territories or Massey's global commons."s2 Courts must
take a more ad hoc approach at the second stage of the analysis when
agency actions occur in foreign countries because each situation will
present unique, complicating factors. The basic formula remains,
however, a weighing of the effects on foreign policy against the benefits
of complying with NEPA.' s The application of NEPA to agency
decisions made in the United States on activities that occur in foreign
countries will be negated only when foreign policy concerns outweigh
NEPA benefits.
If, on the 6ther hand, the court determines that substantial agency
decisions regarding the action are to be made in the foreign country, then
the presumption against extraterritoriality may apply. The court must
then look for a "dear expression" of congressional intent to apply NEPA
to the activity in the foreign country. As discussed above, courts
analyzing NEPA's statutory language, legislative history, and administrative interpretations have largely found NEPA ambiguous on this
point.s4
A court might reach a supportable conclusion that Congress
intended NEPA to apply to federal agency decisions no matter where
they occur after examining NEPA's overall purpose, a test suggested by
the Supreme Court in Bowman. As the Massey court of appeals found,
such a review of NEPA purposes leads to the conclusion that "Congress,
when enacting NEPA, was concerned with worldwide as well as
domestic problems facing the environment."' s
Other courts have concurred that Congress intended NEPA to
protect the world environment. The Greenpeace court recognized that
"NEPA may require a federal agency to prepare an EIS for action taken
abroad, especially where [a) United States agency's action has direct
environmental impacts within this country, or where there has clearly
been a total lack of environmental assessment by the federal agency or
foreign country involved.""' The court was "convinced that Congress
intended to encourage federal agencies to consider the global impact of
domestic actions and may have intended under certain circumstances for
NEPA to apply extraterritorially." 7 Likewise, the Enewetak court found
that "NEPA is framed in expansive language that clearly evidences a
152. See Enewetak, 353 F. Supp. at 818 ("In areas like trust territories there is little, if any,
need for concern about conflicts with United States foreign policy or the balance of world
power.")
153. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 535 (citing Seaborg, 463 F.2d 7%; NRDC, 647 F.2d 1345).
154. See supra part II(B).
155. 986 F.2d at 536 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F)).
156. 748 F. Supp. at 761 (citing Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389; NORML, 452 F. Supp.
at 1233).
157. Id. at 759.
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concern for all persons subject to federal action which has a major impact
on their environment-not merely the United States citizens located in the
fifty states. " ss
Aramco justified reviving the presumption against extraterritoriality based on the assertion that Congress is "primarily concerned with
domestic conditions. " s" The findings of the Massey, Greenpeace, and
Enewetak courts, and almost all other courts reviewing NEPA's extraterritoriality, have reached the conclusion that Congress was clearly concerned with the condition of the world environment when enacting NEPA.
In light of the Massey opinion, the presumption against extraterritoriality
if applied at all in NEPA cases should be applied as a weak presumption
that is strengthened only when the effects on foreign policy or similar
concerns become an issue."W
Despite the development of the Massey court of appeals' test for
application of NEPA to federal agency actions occurring outside the
United States, the first post-Massey decision concerning NEPA's extraterritorial application failed to apply the test. In NEPA Coalition of Japan v.
Aspin,161 plaintiffs contended that certain federal agency activities at

158. 353 F. Supp. at 816. The Enewetak court also found that language in committee
reports, hearings, and debates on the creation of NEPA indicate that Congress intended
NEPA to be broadly applied. Id. at 817.
159. 499 US. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285).
160. Rigid application of a presumption against extraterritoriality rule-as found in
Aramco-has come under increasing fire in recent years:
This century's profound international political, economic, technological,
and legal transformations have significantly undermined the strict
territoriality presumption that prevailed in nineteenth century conceptions
of public international law. The doctrine of territorial sovereignty has been
eroded by the slow emergence of the United Nations and other international institutions, the in~reasing importance of public international law in
domestic affairs, and the international community's diminishing patience
with local tyrants and torturers. Technological advances have ensured that
"domestic" military, environmental, health, social and other developments
have serious international consequences. Communications developments
and the global media have reduced the significance and effectiveness of
national borders.
G. Born, A Reappraisalof the ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Law, 24 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1, 6162 (1992) (citations omitted). Thus, "an inflexible territoriality principle is no longer suited
to the modern world." Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125-29/85, A. AhIstr6m
Osakeyhtio v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193,4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1114,491 (1988),
quoted in Born, 24 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. at 64. See also Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations
Law pt. IV, ch. 1(A) (introductory note) (1986) ("Increasingly, the practice of states has
reflected conceptions better adapted to the complexities of contemporary international intercourse ....Territoriality and nationality remain the principal bases of jurisdiction to
prescribe, but in determining their meaning rigid concepts have been replaced by broader
criteria.")
161. 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

United States military installations in Japan required the DOD to prepare
EISs."2 The District Court for the District of Columbia, over which the
Massey court of appeals' decision has binding authority, distinguished
NEPA Coalition of Japan from Massey because Massey did not involve a
foreign sovereign such as Japan. 16
As in Massey, the NEPA Coalition of Japan district court bypassed
the threshold question of whether the conduct regulated by NEPA
occurred outside the United States and squarely applied the presumption
against extraterritoriality doctrine.'" Without any analysis of congressional intent to have NEPA apply abroad,'" the court emphasized that
"requiring the DOD to prepare EISs... would risk intruding upon a
long standing treaty relationship." 1" Thus, "the presumption against
extraterritoriality not only is applicable, but particularly applies in this
case because there are clear foreign policy and treaty concerns involving
a security relationship between the United States and a sovereign power."" 7 The court therefore found NEPA inapplicable.'"
The district court's analysis in NEPA Coalition of Japan missed an
opportunity to apply the Massey test to a NEPA case directly involving
a foreign country. The district court relied on the Massey court's express
limitation of its ruling to the application of NEPA to Antarctica, but
ignored the fact that the Massey court did not limit its test to such cases.
As a result, the NEPA Coalitionof Japan decision further confuses the case
law regarding NEPA extraterritorial application. If the district court had
applied the Massey test, it could have been the beginning of a coherent
line of cases dealing with the application of NEPA abroad."

162. Id. at 467.
163. Id.
164. Id. In addition, the district court attached the burden that "[ainy doubts concerning
the extraterritorial application of statutes must be resolved restrictively." Id. (citing Smith
v. United States,-U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1178, 1182 (1993)).
165. The court limited its discussion on this issue to a statement that "[pllaintiffs are
unable to show that Congress intended NEPA to apply in situations where there is a
substantial likelihood that treaty relations will be affected." 837 F. Supp. at 467-68 (citing
NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1366-67).

166. 837 F.Supp. at 467 (footnote omitted).
167. Id.at 468.
168. Id. at 467.
169. Even if the district court had applied the Massey test, it could have reached the same
result. As the court noted, Massey dictates that "even if NEPA did apply in this case ....
no EISs would be required because U.S. foreign policy interests outweigh the benefits from
preparing an EIS." Id. at 468 (citing Massey, 986 F.2d at 535; Seaborg, 463 F.2d at 798;
Greenpeace, 748 F. Supp. at 760).
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CONCLUSION

NEPA is a key environmental law that governs the decisions of
United States federal agencies. Because NEPA regulates agency decisionmaking, conduct that almost always occurs entirely or substantially in
this country, the presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply,
as determined by the Massey court of appeals. Rather, the importance of
NEPA, particularly in light of the Massey opinion, dictates that courts
apply a presumption of extraterritoriality in NEPA cases that involve
federal agency actions in foreign countries and global commons. This
presumption should be overcome only when NEPA requirements
significantly conflict with important foreign policy concerns. If applied in
this manner, NEPA can best serve to protect the world environment.
Andrew A. Smith

